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This paper examines monetary policy responses to oil price shocks in a small open
economy that produces traded and non-traded goods. When only labor and oil are used
in production and prices are sticky in the non-traded sector the behavior of in￿ation, the
nominal exchange rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depends crucially
upon whether the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher for
the traded or non-traded sector. If the ratio is smaller (higher) for the traded sector
then a policy that fully stabilizes non-traded in￿ation causes the nominal exchange rate
to appreciate (depreciate) and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise (fall)
when there is a surprise rise in the price of oil. Similar results can hold for a policy
that stabilizes CPI in￿ation. Under a policy that ￿xes the nominal exchange rate,
non-traded in￿ation rises (falls) if the ratio is smaller (larger) for the traded sector.
Analytical results show that a policy of ￿xing the exchange rate always produces a
unique solution and that a policy of stabilizing non-traded in￿ation produces a unique
solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised more than one-for-one with rises in
non-traded in￿ation. A policy that stabilizes CPI in￿ation, however, produces multiple
equilibria for a wide range of calibrations of the policy rule.
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11 Introduction
A search of the recent literature turns up a number of papers written on how policy makers
should respond to oil price shocks, including but not limited to Leduc and Sill (2004), Dhawan
and Jeske (2007), Plante (2009a), and Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008). With almost
no exceptions this work makes use of models suited for a large developed country, such as
the United States. For policy makers from small open economies who may be concerned
with nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates, and trade balances, there is a dearth of
results available. This is true despite the fact that many small open economies are heavy
users of oil products and hence are vulnerable to oil price shocks in the same way that large
economies are.
In this paper I address this issue by developing a continuous time, small open economy model
that can be used to investigate the performance of di￿erent speci￿cations of monetary policy
when the price of oil changes. The economy is small, fully integrated into world capital
markets, and uses labor and oil to produce both traded and non-traded goods. Prices are
sticky in the non-traded sector so that monetary policy may have important real e￿ects on
the economy. To my knowledge this is the ￿rst paper in this area of work that uses a dynamic
general equilibrium model that contains traded and non-traded goods.
Using this model I consider the performance of three di￿erent speci￿cations of monetary
policy. The ￿rst is an in￿ation targeting policy that stabilizes the in￿ation rate of prices in
the non-traded sector (non-traded in￿ation). The second policy considered is an in￿ation
targeting policy that stabilizes CPI in￿ation. The third policy ￿xes the nominal exchange
rate through intervention in the foreign exchange market. I present both analytical and
numerical results regarding the behavior of the model’s variables under each policy and
analytical results which show the conditions under which each policy generates a unique
solution.
The main results are the following. First, I show that whether the ratio of the cost share
of oil to labor is higher in the traded or non-traded sectors is crucial to pinning down the
1behavior of many of the model’s variables. For example, under a policy that successfully
stabilizes non-traded in￿ation around its target level it is possible for the nominal exchange
rate to appreciate or depreciate and the relative price of the non-traded good to rise or fall
depending upon the ratios. If the ratio is higher in the non-traded sector then a rise in
the price of oil causes the nominal exchange rate to appreciate and the relative price of the
non-traded good to rise. If the ratio is lower for the non-traded sector then the opposite
occurs. For certain calibrations of the monetary policy rule, a similar result holds for the
policy that stabilizes CPI in￿ation. Under a policy of ￿xed exchange rates, the response of
non-traded in￿ation is pinned down by the ratio and rises (falls) when the ratio is higher
(lower) in the non-traded sector.
The intuition behind these results is that the oil price shock may have asymmetric e￿ects
on costs (and hence in￿ation) in the traded and non-traded sectors. A policy of stabilizing
non-traded in￿ation works by o￿setting any changes in cost in the non-traded sector by
properly adjusting the nominal exchange rate over time. But since costs may rise or fall in
the non-traded sector (holding the exchange rate ￿xed) this policy may bring about nominal
exchange rate appreciation or depreciation. Similar intuition explains the results for the ￿xed
exchange rate policy. Under this policy the nominal exchange rate is not used to change
costs in the non-traded sector and consequently in￿ation rises (falls) when costs rise (fall) in
the non-traded sector.
I also derive analytical results that show under what conditions these policies produce a
unique solution. The results show that a policy that ￿xes the nominal exchange rate always
produces a unique solution while a policy which stabilizes non-traded in￿ation produces a
unique solution so long as the nominal interest rate is raised by more than one-for-one with
movements in non-traded in￿ation. Under a policy that stabilizes CPI in￿ation, however,
multiple equilibria occur for a wide range of calibrations for the policy rule. The analyt-
ical results show that the weight of the non-traded good in the CPI is very important in
determining what areas of the parameter space produce indeterminacy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the details of the model and the solution
2procedure. Section 3 presents the results. Finally, the paper concludes in section 4.
2 The Model
The model is a continuous time, perfect foresight model of a small, open economy. The
economy is small in that it is a price-taker with regards to the traded good and oil products.
Economic activity on the household side is controlled by a representative agent who derives
utility from traded and non-traded consumption goods and dis-utility from providing labor
to the traded and non-traded sectors. The agent has access to a domestic currency, a
domestic nominal bond, and tradable real bond. Money is motivated by assuming that
holdings of real money balances provides utility to the agent. On the production side, the
traded and non-traded goods are produced using oil and labor. The traded good is produced
by a representative ￿rm operating under perfect competition while the non-traded good is
an aggregate of di￿erentiated products produced by a continuum of ￿rms operating under
monopolistic competition.
As far as notation is concerned, dX is the di￿erential of the variable X, _ X is the time
derivative of X, Xo is the steady state value of X, and ^ X is the log-di￿erential of X, i.e.
^ X = dX
X .
2.1 Prices
The traded good is the numeraire and sells domestically at a price of eP t, where e is the
nominal exchange rate and P t is the world price of the traded good in dollars. The nominal






For convenience I assume that P t is constant and equal to 1 so nominal variables are de￿ated
by e. In general, nominal variables are denoted with a tilde while their real versions are not.
3The nominal price of the non-traded good is given by ~ P n, with an in￿ation rate of

n =
_ ~ P n
~ P n:





n   ): (1)
Real wages are denoted as W n and W t for the non-traded and traded sectors, respectively.
The dollar price of oil in world markets is denoted as P o.
Two o￿cial measures of prices are also used here. The ￿rst is the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), ~ P CPI, which in this model is also equivalent to the core CPI as households do not
directly purchase oil products. The other is the GDP de￿ator, ~ P GDP. The formulas used to
calculate these are given later.
2.2 The Agent’s Optimization Problem







































aggregates non-traded consumption goods Cn and traded consumption goods Ct to produce
an aggregate measure of consumption, C. The parameters , c, and  are the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded
consumption goods, and the wage elasticity of labor supply, respectively. Total labor sup-
ply is L = Ln + Lt where Lt is the amount of labor provided to the traded sector and
Ln =
R 1
0 Ln(i)di is aggregate labor supplied to ￿rms in the non-traded sector. The term
4m = M
e is real holdings of domestic currency while P CPI is the CPI de￿ated by the nominal
exchange rate.
I simplify the utility function by replacing C with its indirect utility version. This is done
by solving for the Marshallian demand functions of Ct and Cn and substituting them back
into C, i.e. maximizing C subject to the constraint that Ct + P nCn = E, where E is real




















CPI in￿ation is therefore

CPI =  + n
_ P n
P n; (3)
where n is the share of non-traded consumption out of aggregate consumption spending.
Real wealth is given by
A = m + b
 + b; (4)
where b is holdings of the tradable real bond and b is real holdings of a nominal bond traded
domestically. The real ￿ow constraint for the agent is given by






 + (i   )b + T + 
n   E   m: (5)
In the budget constraint T is lump sum transfers from the government, n is rebated pro￿ts
from the non-traded sector, r is the real interest rate paid on the tradable bond, and i is
the nominal interest rate paid on the domestic bond.
































subject to equations (4) and (5). De￿ning 1 as the multiplier on the ￿ow constraint, the
























=    r
: (12)
The ￿rst order conditions for E and m are standard. The ￿rst order condition for b provides
a no-arbitrage condition that sets the domestic nominal interest rate i equal to the world real
interest rate plus the rate of depreciation. Equations (10) and (11) set the foregone utility
lost from working more in each sector equal to the respective bene￿t of working more in that
sector. As labor is intersectorally mobile and wages are ￿exible, combining these equations









This equation pins down the aggregate labor supply decision of the agent as a function of
the marginal utility of income and the real wage. Finally, the ￿rst order condition for A
6gives the condition that _ 1 = 0 for all t as  = r.
2.3 Production
Production in the traded sector is done by a representative ￿rm operating under perfect















where t is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil and b1 is a distribution




























Production in the non-traded sector is done by a continuum of ￿rms operating under mo-
nopolistic competition. Each ￿rm produces a di￿erentiated good, Qn(i), which it sells for















where n is the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor and b2 is a distribution













Note that as n is costs denominated in dollars. Costs denominated in terms of the non-
traded good are therefore given by
n
















I assume that the di￿erentiated goods are aggregated into a ￿nal non-traded good, Qn, by












where n is the elasticity of substitution between the various goods. The zero pro￿t condition




















Prices for the individual ￿rms, ~ p(i), are sticky according to setup similar to Calvo (1983).
Each ￿rm i resets its price when it receives a stochastic signal to do so. The signal follows
a Poisson process with an average waiting time of 1
!, so that ! can be calibrated to control
the degree of price stickiness. I also assume that prices grow at rate equal to the steady
state level of in￿ation. This ensures that the markup in steady state is only a￿ected by the
degree of substitutability between the goods, n, and not the steady state rate of in￿ation
8or other factors. Readers interested in more details or derivations regarding this are referred
to Plante (2009b).
Given that a ￿rm receives a signal to reset its price, the ￿rst order condition for ~ p(i) is found


































































I impose a symmetric equilibrium so that each ￿rm that has the opportunity to choose its
price chooses the same price, ~ p. After imposing the symmetric equilibrium and performing
a good deal of algebra, linearizing the ￿rst order condition around a steady state produces
an equation that governs the evolution of n,
_ 












This equation is just a continuous time analogue of the usual di￿erence equation that occurs
in discrete time models and holds for all values of n
o. Note that in￿ation in the non-traded
sector is a function of costs denominated in terms of the non-traded good,
n
Pn, not n. This
occurs because from the point of view of the non-traded ￿rms what matters is the price of
non-traded good, not the price of the traded good. 1







1The fact that I have chosen the traded good as the numeraire does not change the results. It only a￿ects
the way in which the variables are measured.












































which shows that n is irrelevant for the paths of the variables to a ￿rst order.
2.4 Gross Domestic Product
The use of intermediate inputs means that GDP is not equal to the sum of gross output in









The GDP de￿ator, ~ P GDP is calculated as the ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP, and GDP




102.5 The Public Sector
The public sector consists of the central bank and the ￿scal authorities, hereafter simply the





where Md is the domestic component of the nominal money supply and b
g is o￿cial holdings
of the tradable bond. The growth of the money supply is given by
_ M = _ M
d + e_ b

g:
The consolidated government budget constraint is





g   m: (31)
For all cases considered here I assume that T passively adjusts to clear the government
budget constraint.
2.6 Market Clearing in the Non-Traded Sector
Total output must equal total spending on the non-traded consumption good. The market




Note that output in the non-traded sector is demand determined so it adjusts to meet demand
for the consumption good.
112.7 The Current Account
In equilibrium WLt = Qt   P oOt, n = P nQn   P oOn   WLn, and b = 0. Using these
equations in the agent’s budget constraint, and then combining the resulting equation with
the government budget constraint gives an equation linking the current account and net
foreign asset accumulation,
_ b













If one makes use of the market clearing condition for the non-tradables sector this reduces
to
_ b












This equation simply states that the economy accumulates foreign assets whenever the sum
of income from production of the traded good and foreign investment is greater than spending
on traded goods.
2.8 The Price of Oil
I work under the assumption that shocks to the real price of oil are persistent, but temporary,






o); > 0: (34)
2.9 Calibration
The model is calibrated to an initial steady state. A table at the end of the text contains
the starting values of the model’s variables and the settings for the deep parameters. The
following gives a brief discussion about the calibration choices for a few parameters which
are important for the main results of the paper. The appendix contains a section explaining
12the procedure in more detail.
 Price Stickiness in the Non-traded Sector (!) The average life of a price is 1
!. The
empirical evidence suggests a range between one to two quarters using disaggregated
data but a longer life for more aggregated models. I choose a value of 2 so that on
average prices are reset every half year.
 Elasticity of substitution between non-traded goods (n) The value of n con-
trols the steady state markup of price over marginal cost in the non-traded sector.
The calibrations for this parameter are all over the map so there is no one accepted
calibration. I choose a value of 12 so that the markup is small but not negligible.
 Speed of Adjustment of Oil Prices () Estimates for this parameter exist for
monthly and quarterly data. Pre 1986 data suggest a value between .95 and 1 for the
corresponding AR(1) coe￿cient while post-86 data suggest a value around .80. This
corresponds to a range for  between .20 and 0. I choose the conservative value of .10.
 Elasticity of substitution between oil and labor (t and n) Although empirical
evidence for these elasticities for traded and non-traded sectors is non-existent, these
parameters can be calibrated to match the price elasticity of oil demand for ￿rms. A
variety of studies using more aggregated data suggest that these elasticities are generally
small, re￿ecting the di￿culties of substituting for oil products in the short run. Given
the sparsity of data, I set t = n to keep the two sectors symmetric in this regard and
use a value of .50.





o Data on aggregate use of oil by all ￿rms varies depending upon the price of oil, the
time frame being considered, and the country in question. For the baseline calibration
I work with P o
oOt
o = P o
oOn
o = :03. An alternative calibration where P o
oOn
o = :02 is also
considered. As I explain later these two calibrations provide cover the two possible
cases with regards to the ratio of the cost shares that was discussed in the introduction.
132.10 Solution Method
I solve the model by deriving the core dynamic system of di￿erential equations, the variables
of which vary depending upon the policy considered. I then perform a ￿rst order linearization
around the initial steady state and solve the di￿erential equations using standard techniques.
In all cases I check to ensure that a solution exists and that it is unique. The model is saddled
with a unit root and to get around this when solving the model numerically I assume that
r is a function of the debt-GDP ratio of the economy,
r

















; h < 0: (35)
This adds a small negative eigenvalue to the dynamic system instead of the 0 eigenvalue.
3 Results
Before considering speci￿c policies I ￿rst derive some analytical results that hold regardless


























Costs in the traded sector are equal to unity and constant. By taking the total derivative of
the equation for t one can therefore solve for how W changes as a function of the change
in the real price of oil. Doing so gives









l is the cost share of oil and labor, respectively, in the traded sector. Taking
the total derivative of the equation for n and using the result for the change in W gives one
14the change in n,
d



















and the terms n
o and n
l are just the cost shares for the non-traded sector.
Whether n rises or falls depends upon the sign of , which is determined entirely by whether
or not the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share of labor is higher in the traded or
non-traded sector. If the ratio is higher in the traded sector then  is negative and n falls
when the price of oil rises. If the ratio is smaller in the traded sector then n rises whenever
the price of oil rises. The intuition behind this result is that when  is negative the drop in
W is large enough to o￿set the increase in the price of oil so n falls. In the case when 
is positive the drop in wages is not large enough to o￿set the rise in the price of oil and n
rises.
With these results in hand it is possible to begin thinking about the behavior of in￿ation in
the non-traded sector because the linearized di￿erential equation governing n is a function
of dn   dP n. As ~ P n is pre-determined at any point in time the initial change in P n will
always be ^ P n =  ^ e. It is through this mechanism that monetary policy can a￿ect in￿ation
in the non-traded sector. The reason this is true is that changes in the nominal exchange
rate a￿ect the domestic price of oil that the non-traded ￿rms must pay vis-a-vis the price of
the non-traded good. If the domestic currency appreciates (depreciates) then the cost of oil
drops (rises) in terms of the price of the non-traded good. This does not matter for the ￿rm
in the traded sector because the price of the traded good varies directly with the nominal
exchange rate. This will be the driving factor in many of the results that follow.
153.1 Stabilizing Non-Traded In￿ation
The ￿rst policy I consider is one where the central bank focuses on stabilizing the in￿ation
rate of the non-traded good, n. To implement the policy I assume that the central bank
publicly announces that it will adjust the nominal interest rate according to




As the nominal interest rate is the monetary policy target, the nominal supply of money
passively adjusts to clear the money market and the nominal exchange rate ￿oats. The core
dynamic system of the model under this policy consists of equations (1), (12), and (25) for
the jump variables P n, 1, and n, and equations (33) and (34) for the state variables b
and P o.
In the true model where r = r, or assuming that dr is negligible and can be ignored, it
is possible to derive some very useful analytical results for this policy. In particular, it
is possible to show the conditions under which the policy produces a determinate solution
and to also produce some results about the behavior of n, P n, and several other variables
on the transition path. This is possible because under this policy the system of linearized
di￿erential equations for n, P n, and P o form a subsystem that can be solved independently
of the other equations in the model.
The procedure for deriving the sub-system is as follows. The ￿rst order condition for b,
equation (9), gives the interest rate parity condition. When linearized this equation shows
us that
di = d:
Combining this with a linearized version of the monetary policy rule in equation (39) gives
d = d
n:
Making use of this result and the previously derived equation for dn one can write the






















































The coe￿cient k1 is always positive but k2 may be greater than, equal to, or less than 0
depending upon whether or not  is negative, zero, or positive.

















4!(! + )(1   ) + 2

:
Under an in￿ation targeting policy both n and P n are jump variables so if the system is
to have a unique solution there must be 1 negative eigenvalue and 2 positive eigenvalues.
The ￿rst root is always negative so it remains to show under what conditions the last two
roots are positive. I presume ￿rst that the only relevant values of  are those greater than
0. Under that condition we can see that r2 <=> 0 as  <=> 1, with the possibility of
an imaginary root if  is large enough. Given this we can rule out any value of   1 as
a possible candidate. For r3, close inspection reveals that that root will always be greater
than 0 for  > 0, with the possibility of an imaginary root for large enough values of .
In other words, the condition under which this policy produces a unique solution is exactly
the condition found in the standard closed economy New Keynesian model, namely  > 1.
17Making use of the eigenvector associated with r1 the solution for the variables along the

































where h1 is the initial surprise jump in the price of oil.
The solution for n gives us two useful pieces of information. First, notice that for a given
calibration that the deviations of n from its target become smaller and smaller as  becomes
larger and larger. This applies to both the initial jump and along the entire transition path.
In other words, how much in￿ation varies on the transition path depends directly upon
how strongly the central bank announces it will respond to a rise in in￿ation. Second, the
direction of the initial jump in n is entirely determined by the sign of , operating through
k2. If  is positive then k2 is negative and non-traded in￿ation jumps up. If  is negative
then k2 is positive and non-traded in￿ation jumps down.
The initial jump in the relative price depends upon both the solution just derived and the
change in the relative price across steady states. For the simple model considered here,
however, we can ignore the latter issue because the change across steady states is 0. 2 As
with n, the direction of the initial jump and the evolution of P n on the transition path
is determined solely by the sign of . For cases when  is positive P n initially rises and
then declines monotonically on the transition path. If  is negative then P n falls initially
and rises monotonically on the transition path. As ~ P n is initially ￿xed, this means that the
nominal exchange rate appreciates in the former case and depreciates in the latter case. The
magnitude of the initial jump is also sensitive to the value of . In the limit as  goes to




The intuition behind the results for n and P n is simple. In order to keep n close to its
2Since the shock is temporary wages do not change across the steady state and hence neither does n.
Using the ￿rst order condition for ~ p(i) one can then show that Pn does not change across steady state.
18target
n
Pn must remain nearly constant when the price of oil rises. As discussed earlier, the
change in W is pinned down in the traded sector and this then pins down the change in n,
which may increase or decrease depending upon the sign of . But the nominal exchange
rate can adjust instantaneously to adjust P n. For example, if  is positive then wages do
not fall enough to o￿set the rise in the price of oil so n rises. In this case the nominal
exchange rate must appreciate so as to reduce the cost of purchasing oil for the non-traded
￿rms. The relative price of the non-traded good rises and this keeps
n
Pn nearly constant.
The opposite results hold when the  is negative. In this case the nominal exchange rate
depreciates, which raises costs in the non-traded sector by just the right amount to keep
non-traded in￿ation very close to its target.
Given the results for n it is possible to derive results for some of the other variables, as




CPI = [(1   n) + n]d
n:
Under this policy both the rate of depreciation and CPI in￿ation vary directly with n along
the transition path.
It is also possible to link up the behavior of n, i, and what I will refer to as the non-traded
real interest rate, rn. To see where rn comes from, imagine that the agent had access to a
bond indexed to ~ P n. This bond would have a real return of rn and the nominal interest rate





A no-arbitrage condition would ensure that in = i along the transition path so
r
n = r
 + (   
n):
19A ￿rst order approximation of this equation gives
dr
n = (   1)d
n;
which shows that so long as  > 1 then the policy ensures that non-traded real rate rises
whenever non-traded in￿ation rises above its steady state value. This is similar to the result
that holds in closed economy New Keynesian models, except that in that in that case there
is only one real interest rate. The no-arbitrage condition also implies that for cases where
n is kept close to its target that i must be adjusted to vary with rn. Importantly, the exact
manner in which i must be adjusted depends upon  and so it is not always true that interest
rates need to be raised to stabilize n.
All of the results derived so far technically only hold for the model where r = r while the
solution method used is just an approximation to the true model. It remains to be shown
that numerical results are in line with results just derived. To show that this is so, I solve
the model numerically and plot the impulse responses for a number of variables. All plots
show the percentage deviations of the variables from their steady state values, with the
exception of the in￿ation and interest rates, which are in percentages, and the trade and
current account de￿cits, which are in units of GDP. The plot for aggregate consumption
expenditure, E, incorporates relative price changes while E(fix) does not. The variables
TB, CA, and OS are the trade balance, the current account balance, and total spending on
oil by ￿rms.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses when there is a 20 percent rise in the price of oil,
with  calibrated to a large value. Although the solution is an approximation all of the
results match those from the analytical solutions previously derived. The rise in the real
price of oil causes wages to fall but under the baseline calibration  is positive so the drop
in wages is not big enough to o￿set the rise in the price of oil in the non-traded sector and
n rises. Stabilizing n therefore requires the currency to instantaneously appreciate which
causes the relative price of the non-traded good to initially jump up. With n stabilized
close to its target, variations in P n are due almost entirely to variations in , which is above
20its steady state level along the entire transition path. The nominal interest rate and rn both
rise initially and then fall over time.
The behavior of the real variables basically follows what we would expect from economic
intuition. The rise in the price of oil reduces the demand for oil in both sectors and brings
about a reduction in the amount of output produced in the traded sector. Income is lower for
the agent so aggregate consumption expenditure drops, and this income e￿ect along with the
relative price movement induces a sharp and substantial drop in output in the non-traded
sector. Real money balances decline because of the slightly higher interest rates and the
reduction in aggregate consumption. The economy makes use of its ability to smooth the
shock out by borrowing signi￿cantly from international capital markets.
Figure 2 makes explicit the importance of the sign of  by showing the impulse responses
under the alternative calibration where P o
oOn
o is set to 0.02 instead of 0.03. This alternative
calibration makes  negative instead of positive so n falls and
n
Pn is kept constant only if
there is an o￿setting depreciation of the currency. Under the same exact speci￿cation of
monetary policy, it is now the case that P n, , rn, and i initially fall and then rise over time.
As the relative price of the non-traded good is temporarily lower than that of the traded
good, output and consumption of this good decline less than what occurs under the case
where  is positive.
3.2 Stabilizing CPI In￿ation
In practice central banks focus on stabilizing an in￿ation variable other than n, generally
CPI in￿ation, so it is worthwhile considering the implications of this type of policy. I assume
that the central bank implements this policy by adjusting the nominal rate according to the
rule








which is exactly the same as the rule found in equation (39) except that n is replaced with
CPI.
21As with the policy of stabilizing n it is possible to derive analytical results about the
conditions under which this policy delivers a unique solution and analytical results about
the behavior of some of the variables along the transition path. This is true because under
this policy it is again possible to derive a sub-system in P n, n, and P o separate from the
other equations of the model.
The procedure for deriving the sub-system is basically the same as before. The linearized
versions of the monetary policy rule, the equation for CPI in￿ation, and the interest-parity
condition can be combined to give an equation for  of the form
d =
n
1   (1   n)
d
n:
As before, use this equation in the linearized equation for P n. Once this is done one again
has a set of linearized di￿erential equations for P n, n and P o that are functions of these
three variables alone.
There are two jump variables in the subsystem so there must be two positive roots if there
is to be a unique solution. The main result here is that this policy can produce multiple
equilibria in the economy for a wide range of calibrations for . The roots of the subsystem
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From the equation for r2 we can immediately see that there will be trouble depending upon
the value of (1 n). For cases where  < 1
1 n, r2 will be positive with the possibility of
a complex root. If  > 1
1 n then r2 will be negative and there will be multiple equilibria.
This can be seen by noting that the ￿rst term in the square root will be positive in this case
and since we are adding a positive number to 2 we are guaranteed a negative root. Under
22the borderline case where  = 1
1 n, r2 explodes to complex negative in￿nity and we also
have indeterminacy.
It is possible to give a clear explanation of why this occurs by looking at the behavior of , i,
and rn. The solution for  shows that in cases where the policy produces an indeterminate





1   (1   n)
d
n;
which shows that the change in  is enough to force CPI in￿ation to also vary inversely with
n. Substituting the equation for dCPI into the linearized monetary policy rule one has
di =
n
1   (1   n)
d
n;




1   (1   n)
:
From these two equations we can see that a rise in n leads to a fall in both i and rn. But
if the intuition carries over from other models the drop in rn spurs further increases in n
which, through the policy rule, spurs further decreases in , i, and rn. When (1   n) is
greater than 1 the policy creates a response that allows self-ful￿lling expectations to drive
the economy. Note that when (1 n) is less then 1 then these self-ful￿lling expectations
can not occur because a rise in n brings about a rise in rn and this prevents in￿ation from
spiralling out of control.















































23where h1 is again the initial surprise jump in the price of oil. So long as (1 n) < 1, the
direction of the initial jump in in￿ation is determined by the sign of  and the magnitude is
a decreasing function of (1   n). In particular, in the limit as (1   n) approaches 1
the initial jump approaches 0. Since this can only occur if there is a very speci￿c response
from the nominal exchange rate this implies that for this calibration the policy will behave
very closely to the one where the central bank fully stabilizes n.
The equations are, unfortunately, too complicated to be able to derive any more analyti-
cal results so I now turn to numerical simulations. I avoid the indeterminacy problem by
calibrating  to 1.99, which is near the indeterminacy boundary for calibration used here.
This also implies that the monetary authority stabilizes CPI in￿ation to the greatest extent
possible.
The impulse response functions for the baseline calibration are shown in ￿gure 3. Because a
calibration of  = 1:99 is successful at stabilizing n close to its target level the results are
very similar to the ones found in ￿gure 1. Given the similarities of the results for these two
policies I refer the reader to the previous section for a discussion about them. For brevity’s
sake, I do not display the response functions for the alternative calibration, since these will
mirror closely the results found in ￿gure 2.
3.3 A Crawling Peg
While the number of economies that completely ￿x their exchange rates are few, many
countries still occasionally intervene in foreign exchange markets. This section provides
results for the polar case where the nominal exchange rate is completely ￿xed, as opposed
to the in￿ation targeting schemes where the nominal exchange rate was completely free to
￿oat. Under a crawling peg  is the monetary policy variable, the nominal exchange rate is
pre-determined at any point in time, and real money balances adjusts through the capital
account. I assume for simplicity that  is set equal to its steady state level o. In order
to defend the peg the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market whenever
24necessary using its stock of foreign exchange reserves b
g. The core dynamic system of the
model under this policy consists of equations (12) and (25) for the jump variables 1 and n,
and equations (1), (33), and (34) for the state variables P n, k, and P o, where k = b + b
g.
As with the in￿ation targeting policies it is possible to derive analytically the conditions
under which this policy produces a unique solution and also some analytical results for
several variables when r = r. Under this policy the system of equations for P n, n, and P o
































































4!(! + ) + 2

:
In this case P n is a state variables so a unique solution requires two negative eigenvalues. It
is obvious that both r1 and r2 will always be negative for realistic calibrations of ! so this
policy always generates a unique solution in the subsystem. Interestingly enough, this policy
produces a unique solution even though rn falls when in￿ation rises because the policy does
not create a feedback e￿ect that leads to self-ful￿lling expectations.












































25where h1 is again just the initial jump in oil prices and
h2 =  
2!( + !)k2




4!( + !) + 2
ih1:
Note that the sign of h2 is determined entirely by the sign of  through the term k2.
These solutions are more complicated than in the previous cases and do not lead to many
easily interpretable solutions. But after performing some algebra it can be shown that the
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3
5 k2
!(! + )   ( + )
h1:
While it is not possible to sign the initial jump for all possible values of the deep parameters,
so long as ! is greater than , a likely case, the jump in in￿ation is pinned down by the
sign of , with in￿ation rising immediately if  is positive and falling if  is negative. With
the nominal exchange rate ￿xed variations in n are not immediately o￿set by movements
in P n. Therefore costs rise or fall, depending upon the sign of , and ￿rms o￿set this by
raising or lowering their prices, which leads to non-traded in￿ation rising or falling.




Under a ￿xed exchange rate policy the non-traded real interest consequently falls whenever




so CPI in￿ation varies directly with non-traded in￿ation.
As before, more comprehensive results can only be had by solving the model numerically.
The impulse response functions for the baseline calibration are shown in ￿gure 4. The rise in
26the price of oil raises n but since e is ￿xed this brings about an immediate rise in non-traded
in￿ation. Over time ￿rms adjust to the temporarily high cost of oil by raising their prices,
which causes the relative price of the non-traded good to rise over time. The fact that P n
is temporarily lower than what occurs under the in￿ation targeting policy manifests itself
in a higher level of Qn, initially. As P n rises, however, the agent reduces consumption of
the non-traded good, which shows up as a rapid decline in Qn over the ￿rst year. Figure 5
shows the results for the alternative calibration of the model. When  is negative the rise
in oil prices now reduces n which in turn causes n to drop initially and for P n to fall over
time, while rn initially rises.
4 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is to examine monetary policy responses to oil price shocks
in a small, open economy with traded and non-traded goods as opposed to the large, closed
economy model that has been the mainstay so far. This change allows one to consider issues
with exchange rates and relative prices that are necessarily ignored in the closed economy
models.
The main result in this paper is that because of the asymmetric e￿ects a rise in the price of
oil has on costs in the traded and non-traded sectors it is possible for the same speci￿cation
of monetary policy to produce very di￿erent behavior in in￿ation, the nominal exchange
rate, and the relative price of the non-traded good depending upon the cost shares of oil and
labor in the two sectors. Under the assumptions made in the paper the behavior of wages is
pinned down in the traded goods sector. If the ratio of the cost share of oil to the cost share
of labor is higher (lower) in the traded sector then costs and in￿ation in the non-traded sector
fall (rise) unless monetary policy responds appropriately. A successful in￿ation targeter who
stabilizes n does so by o￿setting these changes in cost by bringing about exactly the correct
movement needed in the nominal exchange rate. The exact movement depends, though, on
ratios and hence it is possible for this policy to cause a nominal exchange rate depreciation
27or appreciation. A similar result holds for an in￿ation targeter who stabilizes CPI in￿ation,
for certain calibrations of the policy rule. For similar reasons, a policy of ￿xed nominal
exchange rates, because it precludes any such adjustment in the nominal exchange rate, can
bring about increases or decreases in non-traded in￿ation.
The second set of important results is related to the ability of the policies to produce unique
solutions. I have also shown analytically under what conditions the three policies produce
multiple equilibria in the economy. A policy that stabilizes non-traded in￿ation only produces
an indeterminate solution if the nominal interest rate is not raised more than one-for-one
with a rise in non-traded in￿ation. A policy that stabilizes CPI in￿ation, however, produces
multiple equilibria for a wide range of calibrations. The analytical results show that whether
this occurs or not is a function of how strongly the central bank pledges to respond to rises
in CPI in￿ation and the share of the non-traded good in the CPI. If the pledged response
is too strong then the policy response leads to self-ful￿lling expectations. A crawling peg,
unlike the other two policies, always produces a unique solution for the model considered
here.
While this paper has produced a number of useful and interesting results, the model used
is simple and highly stylized and future research could expand upon the model in several
ways. One useful line of work would be to introduce further frictions in the model, such
as sticky nominal wages or less then full labor mobility between the two sectors. A second
line of work would be to add a second country and make endogenous the foreign variables of
the model. While this would be a signi￿cantly more complicated model it would allow for
greater realism and a much wider range of questions that could be investigated than with
the simple model used here.



















29Figure 1: Non-Traded In￿ation, Baseline Calibration



















































































































































































30Figure 2: Non-Traded In￿ation, Alternative Calibration
















































































































































































31Figure 3: CPI In￿ation, Baseline Calibration


















































































































































































32Figure 4: Fixed Rates, Baseline Calibration
































































































































































































33Figure 5: Fixed Rates, Alternative Calibration
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